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Abstract. Intertheoretic relations are an important topic in the philosophy
of science. However, since their discussion in (Nagel, 1961), such relations
have mostly been restricted to relations between pairs of theories in the nat-
ural sciences. In this paper, we present models of two new types of interthe-
oretic relations, called Montague Reduction and Integrative Reduction, that
are assumed in Montague’s (1973) theories of natural language syntax and
semantics. To show the rationale behind our adoption of these two kinds of
relations, we analyze them in the framework of Bayesian confirmation theory.
Keywords Intertheoretic relations, Bayesian confirmation, Bayesian networks
in philosophy, Reduction, Syntax-semantics map.
1. Introduction
Methodology is one of the central concerns in philosophy of science. While sci-
entists are occupied with the collection of data, the formulation and testing of
hypotheses (or theories), and the creation of phenomena, philosophers of sci-
ence are interested in the identification of methods for the theories’ evaluation
and justification. In the last hundred years, the majority of work on scientific
methodology has focused on the natural sciences, especially on physics. However,
there is also a considerable body of methodological work in other sciences like
linguistics. The latter includes Chomsky’s (1966) work on explanatory models
in linguistics, and the recent work of Schu¨tze, e.g. (Schu¨tze, 1996; 2011). Yet,
while these works have received due attention in their own academic field, they
have been largely neglected by philosophers of science.
The present paper focuses on a particular issue in linguistic methodology,
intertheoretic relations. Since the publication of (Nagel, 1961), intertheoretic
relations have been an important topic in the philosophy of science. However,
subsequent research has concentrated almost exclusively on relations between
pairs of theories in the natural sciences. In this paper, we present models of two
new types of intertheoretic relations, called Montague Reduction and Integrative
Reduction, that are assumed in Montague’s (1973) theory of natural language
syntax and semantics. To do this, we first identify the relation of Montague
Reduction and develop its associated model. The latter is then refined into (a
model of) the more sophisticated relation of Integrative Reduction.
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Montague Reduction and Integrative Reduction are related to the best-
studied intertheoretic relation, Nagelian reduction, and other undirected de-
pendency relations by family resemblance. Like Nagelian reduction, Montague
Reduction and Integrative Reduction aim to derive a proposition of the reduced
theory (here, Montague syntax, or Categorial Grammar) from a proposition of
the reducing theory (Montague’sModel-Theoretic Semantics). As a consequence,
our two new intertheoretic relations share the rationale of Nagelian reduction:
The reduction of syntax to semantics promotes cognitive economy and simplic-
ity, explains the success of the reduced theory in terms of the reducing theory,
establishes their relative consistency, and effects a mutual flow of confirmation
between the two theories, cf. (Dijzadji-Bahmani et al., 2010b).
In view of the success of the Nagelian model1, however, the question arises
whether the relation between Categorial Grammar and Model-Theoretic Seman-
tics requires a different analysis than the (arguably similar) relation between
many other pairs of scientific theories (paradigmatically, the relation between
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics). Admittedly, Categorial Grammar
and Model-Theoretic Semantics are mainstream theories of linguistic syntax and
semantics.2 Montague’s view of their interrelation is today widely adopted. Yet,
it remains unclear whether their prominence in contemporary linguistics pro-
vides sufficient reason for the introduction of a new model of Integrative (or
Montague) Reduction.
Our paper answers the preceding question in the affirmative. To show the
need for a new model of the relation between Categorial Grammar and Model-
Theoretic Semantics, we adopt an epistemic framework. In particular, we deter-
mine that the Integrative Reduction of Categorial Grammar to Model-Theoretic
Semantics is epistemically preferable to their Montague Reduction or Nagelian
reduction (in the sense that it raises the prior and posterior probabilities and the
degree of confirmation of the two theories), and that their Montague or Nagelian
Reduction of is epistemically preferable (in the above sense) to the pre-reductive
situation.
The paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 present Montague’s
formal framework for the analysis of natural language syntax and semantics,
and review relevant concepts from Bayesian confirmation and network theory.
The remaining sections focus on the simultaneous development and evaluation
of our model of Integrative Reduction. Section 4 provides a Bayesian analysis
of the syntax-semantics relation before and after the execution of a Montague
Reduction and shows that, post-reduction, the two theories are confirmatory of
each other. Section 5 identifies a problem with Montague Reduction, revises
its model into a model of the relation of Integrative Reduction, and shows in
which respects it is epistemically preferable to Montague Reduction. We close
by indicating how our model of Integrative Reduction can be incorporated into
a sophisticated variant of Schaffner’s revised model of Nagelian reduction.
1For many years, Nagelian reduction has been considered a dead end. The present paper
rejects this assumption. While Nagel’s original model of reduction, cf. (Nagel, 1961), suffers
from various problems, the latter are overcome in Schaffner’s revised version, cf. (Nagel, 1977;
Schaffner, 1974). For the present purposes, it will suffice to focus only on the Nagelian model.
We outline a Schaffner-style extension of our model of Integrative Reduction in Section 6.
2Textbooks on linguistic syntax and semantics that are based on the two theories include
(Heim and Kratzer, 1998), (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet, 2000), and (de Swart, 1998).
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2. Montague Grammar
We begin with a presentation of the two theories that we aim to relate. Sec-
tion 2.1 states their objects and object-connecting mechanism. Section 2.2 com-
pares the Montagovian account of the syntax-semantic relation with the Nagelian
model of intertheoretic reduction. To enable a Bayesian analysis of our new type
of intertheoretic relation, Section 2.3 identifies syntactic and semantic proposi-
tions with the objects of probabilistic evaluations.
2.1. Montague’s ‘Two Theories’ Theory. Richard Montague’s ‘Universal
Grammar’ provides a formal framework for the analysis and interpretation of
natural language syntax, based on (Montague, 1970a; 1973; 1970b). Montague
conceives of natural languages as interpreted formal systems: The syntax of a
language (hereafter ‘Categorial Grammar’, CG) is specified through the enu-
meration of grammatical categories, CAT = {N(oun),V(erb), S(entence), . . . },
their associated structures (‘expressions’), E = {En, Ev, Es, . . . } (with En =
{John,Mary,Fido, . . . }), and the definition of rules, G = {Gs, . . . }, governing
the behavior of syntactic operations like concatenation and conjunction. The
latter apply to tuples of expressions to yield unique complex expressions. Mon-
tague syntax thus constitutes an algebra, Acg = {{En, Ev, . . . },Gs, . . . }, over the
set of basic expressions. A language (e.g. English) is identified with the closure
of the set {En, Ev, . . . } under the rules of the algebra.3(Janssen, 1986)
Model-Theoretic Semantics (MS) matches the syntactic algebra on the level
of natural language meaning. The interpretation function I establishes a rela-
tion between syntactic expressions and their semantic referents. For every E-
constant c (e.g. John), we assume a denotation, ￿c￿ (e.g. ), such that ￿c￿ = I(c).
We call the set {Dn,Dv,Ds, . . . } (containing the domains of individual objects,
properties, truth-values, etc.) of E-denotations ‘D’ and stipulate that it be non-
empty. Every syntactic rule, Gki (with k ∈ CAT, i ∈ N)4 is associated with a
semantic rule, Ski , that governs the behavior of the syntactic operations’ seman-
tic counterparts (e.g. functional application, set intersection). The semantics of
a language thus constitutes an algebra Ams = {{Dn,Dv, . . . }, Ss, . . . } over the set
of denotations. Its interpretation is identified with the closure of this set under
the rules in S. Expressions and their denotations, as well as syntactic and se-
mantic rules, are related via a map from the syntactic algebra to the (polynomial
closure of the) semantic algebra.
Significantly, the above-described map5 is not strictly one-to-one. This is
due to the semantic ambiguity of nouns and verbs, and attendant impossibility
of mapping every element of the syntactic algebra onto a unique element of the
semantic algebra. Rather than being associated with a single class of semantic
referents, nouns (e.g. John) may be interpreted either as individual objects (i.e.
3For an introduction to Montague’s theory of syntax and semantics, the reader is referred
to (Partee, 1997) and (Gamut, 1991).
4Our use of category indices (i.e. i) is motivated by the fact that some categories (especially
the category ‘S’) are associated with different rules (cf. Montague’s rules S4, S9, S11, S14, S17
(Montague, 1973)). Their association with semantic rules T4, T9, T11, T14, T17 preserves the
above-noted correspondence. Since the remainder of this paper will only be concerned with the
sentence-formation rules S4 and T4, we hereafter suppress their number.
5Since Montague’s syntax-semantics ‘map’ is multi-valued, it may be more adequate to call
it a ‘relation’. However, since the term syntax-semantics map is standard in linguistics, we
hereafter adopt this term.
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= ￿John￿￿) or as generalized quantifiers (i.e. the set, ￿John￿￿￿, of all of John’s
properties).6 This is made necessary by the possibility of conjoining proper
names with quantifier phrases (cf. the expression John and every woman), and
the restriction of coordination to same-domain objects, cf. (Partee, 1987). To
preserve function-argument structure, we similarly interpret intransitive verbs
(e.g. run) either as properties of individual objects (e.g. ￿run￿￿) or as properties
of generalized quantifiers (e.g. ￿run￿￿￿). Figure 1 illustrates the map (symbolized
by dotted lines with arrows) between elements of the syntactic and semantic
algebra.
Dn￿ ￿￿ ￿ Dv￿ ￿￿ ￿￿John￿￿￿, ￿run￿￿, ￿run￿￿￿,
,
￿Mary￿￿￿ ￿walk￿￿ ￿walk￿￿￿ T,F
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D￿￿v . . .
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John, run, John runs,
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￿
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￿
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Figure 1. Montague’s syntax-semantics relation.
Since the identification of the domains Dn and Dv with the set {D￿n,D￿￿n}, re-
spectively {D￿v,D￿￿v} preserves the structure of the syntactic algebra, we hereafter
describe Montague’s syntax-semantic map as the homomorphism h. To facilitate
the representation of the Montagovian framework, we assume the existence of
only three classes of expressions or objects. We demonstrate in Section 5.2 that
our new model of reduction is easily extensible to the remaining categories (e.g.
adjectives, adverbs, determiners and their semantic correspondents).
In line with the constructive requirements of syntax and semantics, our pre-
sentation of the Montagovian framework has only stipulated rules for the for-
mation of complex expressions and entities (e.g. sentences and truth-values).
For future use, we also assume rules for the identity of basic objects. Thus,
the rules Gn,Gv are simple rewrite rules, taking words in the lexicon to expres-
sions in the syntax. The rules Sn, Sv constitute their semantic counterparts.
Note that, by the ambiguity noun- and verb-interpretations, the rules Sn, Sv
(but not Gn,Gv) will include two different cases, covering D￿n and D￿￿n, and D￿v
and D￿￿v, respectively.
The formation of minimally complex sentences (e.g. John runs) is governed
by the rule Gs, below:
Let [AB] represent the concatenation of the expressions A and B. The rule Gs
is then defined as follows, cf. (Montague, 1973, p. 251):
6Intuitively, ￿John￿￿￿ abbreviates Montague’s ￿λP.P (John)￿, where P ranges over first-order
properties, with John an individual constant. Properties of generalized quantifiers (e.g. the
property ￿run￿￿￿) constitute similar abbreviations.
REDUCTION, CONFIRMATION, AND THE SYNTAX-SEMANTICS RELATION 5
Gs. If R ∈ Ev and j ∈ En, then [jR￿] ∈ Es,
where R￿ is the result of replacing the main verb in R (e.g. run) by its third
person singular present form (runs). The concatenation of a noun (e.g. John)
with an inflected verb (runs) thus yields a sentence (John runs).
Semantic rules follow their syntactic counterparts: Given the replacement
of syntactic categories, Ek, by referential domains, Dk, and interpretation
of concatenation and agreement as functional application, nothing changes.
Clause Ss (below) defines the semantic correspondent of rule Gs, cf. (Montague,
1973, p. 254).
Ss. If ￿R￿ ∈ Dv and ￿j￿ ∈ Dn, then ￿R￿(￿j￿) ∈ Ds.
Note that, by the set-like character of Dn = {D￿n,D￿￿n} and Dv = {D￿v,D￿￿v}, the
rule Ss is understood as the conjunction of rules S￿s and S￿￿s , below:
S￿s. If ￿R￿￿ ∈ D￿v and ￿j￿￿ ∈ D￿n, then ￿R￿￿(￿j￿￿) ∈ Ds.
S￿￿s . If ￿R￿￿￿ ∈ D￿￿v and ￿j￿￿￿ ∈ D￿￿n, then ￿R￿￿￿(￿j￿￿￿) ∈ Ds.
According to S￿s, the application of the first-order property ￿runs￿￿ to the denota-
tion, , of John yields either truth (i.e. ￿runs￿￿( ) = T) or falsity (F). According
to S￿￿s , the application of the higher-order property ￿runs￿￿￿ to the generalized
quantifier, ￿John￿￿￿, denoted by John yields either truth (i.e. ￿runs￿￿￿Ä￿John￿￿￿ä =
T) or falsity (F).
2.2. Montague’s Theory and Intertheoretic Reduction. In the context of
our introduction (cf. Sect. 1), we have already described the syntax-semantics
pair as the instantiation of a specific type of intertheoretic relation. To em-
phasize its similarities and differences with the Nagelian account of reduction,
we next describe the reduction of syntax to semantics on the Nagelian model.
Given the description of Montague’s syntax-semantics relation from the previous
subsection, a comparison between accounts of the two types of relations is easily
carried out.
In the following, we assume a reduced (or phenomenological) theory, T2, and
a reducing (or fundamental) theory, T1.7 Renownedly, Nagelian reduction is a
three-step process, involving the establishment of connections (via bridge laws)
between terms in the non-logical vocabulary of the theories T1 and T2 (i), the
substitution of terms from T1 by their bridge-law correspondents from T2 (ii),
and the derivation of every proposition in T2 from a proposition in T1 (iii).
Accordingly, the use of the Nagelian model of reduction for the reduction of the
syntax-semantics pair requires a formulation of the bridge laws Dn ￿ N, Dv ￿
V, Ds ￿ S, etc. (i), the substitution of the domain-denoting expressions ‘Dn’,
‘Dv’, and ‘Ds’ by the category-denoting expressions ‘N’, ‘V’, resp. ‘S’ (ii), and
the derivation of every proposition in Acg (e.g. the proposition Gs) from the
corresponding proposition (here, Ss) in Ams (iii).
Clearly, the Nagelian model of reduction (hereafter Nagel Reduction, or NR)
and the Montagovian model of the syntax-semantics relation (hereafter Mon-
tague Reduction, or MR) share the final step (iii) of the above-described process.
7The use of the adjectives phenomenological and fundamental, which suggests the direction-
ality of the reduction relation, is in accordance with the treatment of theories in physics.
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The two models further agree with respect to the connectability of (the deno-
tations of) terms in the two theories’ non-logical vocabularies. However, while
Nagel Reduction satisfies the requirement of intertheoretical connectability (i)
through the formulation of (syntactic) bridge laws, Montague reduction satis-
fies this requirement through the assumption of a (semantic) homomorphism
between the objects of the syntactic and the semantic algebra. Since the latter
also establishes connections between propositions of the two theories, Montague
Reduction obviates Nagel’s substitution step (ii).
But the semantic characterization of connectability and the absence of the
substitution step are not the only salient properties of Montague Reduction.
Importantly, the latter is also defined by the homomorphism’s non-symmetry.
Arguably, the Nagelian and the ‘Montagovian’ model both characterize reduc-
tion as a directed dependency relation (This is reflected in the identification
of one of the two theories with the phenomenological theory and of the other
with the fundamental theory). However, while the semantic ambiguity of some
syntactic categories in the Montagovian model makes the directedness of the
syntax-semantics relation explicit, Nagel’s formalization of bridge laws as bicon-
ditional statements conceals this property. As a consequence, the Nagelian –
but not the Montagovian – model of reduction represents the reduction relation
as a symmetric relation. To emphasize the symmetric representation of Nagel
Reduction, we will sometimes describe the latter as an undirected relation.8
The directed dependency between Categorial Grammar and Model-Theoretic
Semantics (described above) motivates our identification of Categorial Grammar
with the phenomenological theory and of Model-Theoretic Semantics with the
fundamental theory. Figure 2 compares Montague’s description of the syntax-
semantics relation (right) with the Nagelian account of reduction (left):
T1
T2
bridge laws
Ss
Gs
the map h−1
=
¶
S￿s, S￿￿s
©
Figure 2. The Nagelian model (left) and the Montagovian
model of reduction (right).
Note our use of dashed (rather than dotted) in the above figure. This change
in notation is required by the directedness of the syntax-semantics relation, and
an attendant a change in the arrows’ denotation. While the ‘dotted’ arrows in
Figure 1 (cf. Sect. 2.1) represent Montague’s map h : Acg → Ams, the ‘dashed’
arrows in Figure 2 represent its inverse h−1 : Ams → Acg.
For future reference, we provide the following definitions of Nagel Reduction
and of Montague Reduction in terms of their salient properties:
8For a discussion of this issue and a Nagelian solution, the reader is referred to (Kuipers,
1982) and (Dijzadji-Bahmani et al., 2010a).
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Definition 1 (Nagel Reduction (NR)). A type of undirected (i.e. symmetrically
represented) dependency relation, described by Nagel (1961), that is defined by
the existence of intertheoretical connections between terms in the related theo-
ries’ non-logical vocabularies, and by the derivability of every proposition in the
phenomenological theory from a corresponding proposition in the fundamental
theory.
Definition 2 (Montague Reduction (MR)). A type of directed (or non-
symmetric) dependency relation, implicit in (Montague, 1973), that is defined by
the existence of intertheoretical connections between objects of the two related
theories, and by the derivability of every proposition in the phenomenological
theory from a corresponding proposition in the fundamental theory.
The commonalities and differences between Nagel Reduction and Montague
Reduction are captured in Figure 3.
Derivability

®
NR
´
Syntactic interth. connectability (via bridge laws);®
MR
´ Syntactic interth. connectability (via bridge laws),Undirected dependency
Semantic interth. connectability (via the map h−1),
Directed dependency
Figure 3. Nagel Reduction vs. Montague Reduction.
As is clear from the above, the Montagovian model of the syntax-semantic re-
lation instantiates only one particular type of intertheoretic relation. There are
many others, ranging from ‘strict’ Nagel Reduction (cf. Def. 1) via the ‘weaker’
Nagel-Schaffner reduction (Schaffner, 1967; 1974), cf. (Nagel, 1977), to undi-
rected dependency relations, cf. (Darden and Maull, 1977; Hartmann, 1999;
Mitchell, 2003). We expect that the relation between Categorial Grammar and
Model-Theoretic Semantics be found in the mid-range of this spectrum.
Significantly, the previously discussed Montague Reduction (cf. Def. 2, and
Sect. 4) may not be identified with the relation of Integrative Reduction, which
will be introduced in Section 5. Admittedly, both models of the syntax-semantics
relation share salient properties (e.g. semantic intertheoretic connectability and
directedness). Notably, however, Montague Reduction lacks the latter’s defining
property: intratheoretic connectability. In this sense, our model of Montague
Reduction constitutes only an intermediate step towards the development of our
model of Integrative Reduction. This is not to deny that Montague Reduction
be taken as an intertheoretic relation in its own right. We will see, however, that
Integrative Reduction constitutes a considerable generalization and, in certain
respects, improvement of Montague Reduction.
We close the present subsection with a number of caveats about the syntax-
semantics relation. Our previous considerations have identified Montague Reduc-
tion as a weak, i.e. directed, variant of Nagel Reduction. Significantly, however,
the presented intertheoretic relation is even weaker than has been previously
established. This is due to the greater structural richness of Categorial Gram-
mar, and attendant impossibility of providing a semantic account of all syntactic
properties. Word order and agreement are a case in point: To obtain the ‘right’
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complex expressions, Montague’s syntactic rules specify the order of their con-
stituent basic expressions, and the conditions for their agreement. Without this
specification, we would concatenate the expressions John and run into the com-
plex expression Run John rather than John runs. Other problems regard the
denotation of the same semantic object by differently-formed expressions and
the existence of purely syntactic well-formedness constraints. All of the above
motivate our description of Montague (and also of Integrative) Reduction as a
distinct type of intertheoretic relation, rather than strong Nagelian reduction.
Our characterization of the syntax-semantics relation as a (very weak) reduc-
tive relation requires a further clarification: All popular accounts of reduction
(including (Nagel, 1961)) assume the existence of the relevant theories’ common
domain of application. On this account, the reduced and the reducing theory
both make (more-or-less) the same claims (e.g. about the behavior of a given
physical system). This is not the case for our syntax-semantics pair. While
Categorial Grammar accounts for the well-formedness of syntactic structures,
Model-Theoretic Semantics accounts for their denotations’ constructive prop-
erties. Admittedly, the denotation relation (formalized by the interpretation
function I (cf. Sect. 2.1)) establishes a firm connection between the objects of
the two theories. This does not change the fact, however, that their ‘reductive
achievement’ will be comparatively weaker.
All of the above admonitions characterize our new type of intertheoretic
relation. While they will be ignored in the rest of this paper, their neglect
would distort our representation of the syntax-semantics relation. To enable
the Bayesian analysis of its associated model, the following subsection discusses
the use of probabilities in this part of linguistics. Section 3 gives a primer on
Bayesian confirmation and network theory.
2.3. Montagovian Rules and Probabilities. Our presentation of Montague’s
theory has presupposed the existence of two sets of rules, G, S, for the formation
of complex expressions and entities. Like hypotheses of any scientific theory, the
latter are obtained by the scientific method (discussed, here, for the formulation
of Gs): Following the isolation of simple sentences in a given data-set (typically,
an electronic text collection like the British National Corpus), linguists abstract
information about the sentences’ structural properties and propose a hypothesis
(e.g. Gs) about their formation. Hypotheses are tested through the analysis
of other (new) corpora: A given string of expressions (e.g. the sentence John
runs) is taken to support the hypothesis if its structure does, questions it if it
does not reflect the assumed formation process (i.e. if it ‘positively/negatively
instantiates’ Gs).
To enable a Bayesian analysis of our model(s) of the syntax-semantics re-
lation, we assign a probability to every syntactic or semantic rule. A rule’s
probability is informed by the frequentist data available at the time. Thus, the
probability of the truth of the hypothesized rule Gs will be very high (low) if a
very large (small) percentage of expressions of the described form instantiates Gs.
Intuitively, a rule’s frequentist probability will influence a linguist’s psychologi-
cal confidence in its descriptive adequacy. Consequently, if a very large (small)
percentage of expressions of a given form instantiates the rule Gs, we expect the
linguist’s belief in the truth of Gs to be similarly high (or low).
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Our previous considerations have defined the probability of a given rule via
their positive instantiations’ frequency in a given sample. Notably, however, only
syntactic rules are directly instantiated. This difference, which motivates our
reductive endeavor, will recur in the two theories’ pre-reductive confirmation (cf.
Thm. 1, Sect. 4.1). The semantic rule Ss derives its support from the linguistic
support of Gs via the assumption of the homomorphism h. While rules for the
construction of more complex objects (e.g. the denotation of the sentence Mary
walked for an hour or John runs fast) are directly supported by the established
entailment relations and speakers’ validity judgements, cf. (Dowty, 1979), the
restriction of entailment to sentences prevents the direct semantic support of the
simple rules Sn, Sv and (by extension) Ss. Their probabilities are defined by the
probabilities of their syntactic counterparts.
This concludes our discussion of the reductive and probabilistic aspects of
Montague’s theory. Before we move to our introduction to Bayesianism, however,
one final caveat is in order: Importantly, our attribution of probabilities to
Montagovian rules does not constitute a probabilistic extension of Montague
Grammar. The central aim of our paper is methodological, not substantive.
Consequently, we do not intend any revisions or additions to (our fragment of)
Montague’s theory. The attribution of probabilities is only a means to an end,
i.e. the possibility of providing a Bayesian analysis of its associated model. For
the latter, it will suffice to restrict ourselves to the use of probabilistic variables.
While nothing prevents us from plugging in actual values, this is not necessary
for the success of our analysis.
3. A Primer on Bayesianism
We analyze a rule’s evidential support via Bayesian confirmation theory: Its
central idea constitutes the interpretation of confirmation as probability-raising,
and associated distinction between two notions of probability, relative to the
receipt of a new piece of evidence: The initial, or prior, probability of a propo-
sition H (for ‘hypothesis’) is the probability of H before, its final, or posterior,
probability the probability after the evidence E is considered.
Bayesian conditionalization on E requires an update of the prior probabil-
ity, P(H), to the posterior probability, P ￿(H), of H, where P ￿(H) is typically
expressed in terms of the original probability measure, i.e. P ￿(H) = P(H|E),
provided that P(E) > 0. Our use of Bayes’ Theorem, a result from probability
theory, yields the following expression for the posterior probability of H:
P(H|E) = P(E|H)P(H)
P(E)
=
P(E|H)P(H)
P(E|H)P(H) +P(E|¬H)P(¬H) (1)
=
P(H)
P(H) +P(¬H)x .
In the above, the expression x := P(E|¬H)/P(E|H) is the likelihood ratio.
According to Bayesian confirmation theory, a piece of evidence E confirms a
hypothesis H if the posterior probability of H (given E) is greater than the prior
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probability of H, i.e. if P(H|E) > P(H). The piece of evidence, E, disconfirms H
if P(H|E) < P(H), and is irrelevant for H if P(H|E) = P(H).9
While the case of two propositions is easy to compute, the confirmatory
situation is often much more complicated. This is due to the fact that the
respective hypothesis may have a fine structure, and that there may be different
pieces of evidence that stand in certain probabilistic relations to each other. As
we will see is due course, the relation between syntax and semantics, upon which
we focus in this paper, exhibits a similarly high degree of complexity.
Bayesian networks prove to be a highly efficient tool for the computation
of the above-described scenarios.10 A Bayesian network is a directed acyclical
graph whose nodes represent propositional variables and whose arrows encode
the conditional independence relations that hold between the variables. The rest
of this paragraph introduces some useful vocabulary: Parent nodes are nodes
with outgoing arrows; child nodes nodes with incoming arrows. Root nodes
(marked in grey) are unparented nodes; descendant nodes are child nodes, or the
child of a child node, etc.
By the special choice of graph, paths of arrows may not lead back to them-
selves (thus motivating the graph’s acyclicity). Variables at each node can
take different numerical values, assigned by the probability function P. Thus,
Bayesian networks do not only provide a direct visualization of the probabilistic
dependency relations between variables, but come along with a set of efficient
algorithms for the computation of whichever conditional or unconditional prob-
ability over a (sub-)set of the variables involved we are interested in.
We illustrate the use of Bayesian networks by framing the confirmatory re-
lation between H and E. To do so, we first introduce two binary propositional
variables, H and E (printed in italic script). Each of them has two values
(printed in roman script): H or ¬H (i.e. ‘the hypothesized rule is true/false’),
and E or ¬E (‘the evidence obtains/does not obtain’), respectively. The relation
between E and H can then be represented in the graph in Figure 4.
H E
Figure 4. Bayesian network representation of the dependence
between E and H.
The arrow from H to E denotes a direct influence of the variable in the parent
to the variable in the child node. The truth or falsity of the hypothesis affects
the probability of the obtaining of E.
To turn the graph from Figure 4 into a Bayesian network, we further require
the marginal probability distribution for each variable in a root node (i.e. the
9Bayesianism is presented and critically discussed in (Howson and Urbach, 2005) and in
(Earman, 1992). These texts also discuss Jeffrey conditionalization, which is an alternative
updating rule. For an introduction to Bayesian epistemology, see (Ha´jek and Hartmann, 2010)
and (Hartmann and Sprenger, 2010).
10For an introduction to Bayesian networks, see (Neapolitan, 2003; Pearl, 1988). (Bovens
and Hartmann, 2003) discusses applications from epistemology and the philosophy of science,
and provides a short introduction to the theory of Bayesian networks.
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prior probability, P(H), of H), and the conditional probability distribution for
every variable in a child node, given its parents. In the present case, the lat-
ter involves fixing the likelihoods P(E|H) and P(E|¬H). Using the machinery of
Bayesian networks, we can then obtain all other probabilities. As will be relevant
below, the graph’s probability distribution respects the Parental Markov Con-
dition (PMC): A variable represented by a node in a Bayesian network is inde-
pendent of all variables represented by its non-descendant nodes in the Bayesian
network, conditional on all variables represented by its parent nodes.
4. Reduction and Confirmation I: Nagelian Pairwise Reduction
Our previous considerations of Montague Reduction have been restricted to the
presentation of its associated model. To provide a rationale for the introduction
of this model as a ‘new’ model of intertheoretic relations (in addition to the
established Nagelian model), we next provide a Bayesian analysis of Montague
Reduction. The present section investigates the result of performing a Montague
Reduction of Categorial Grammar to Model-Theoretic Semantics. Section 5 in-
vestigates the probabilistic and confirmation-theoretic advantages of performing
a refined variant of Montague Reduction, called Integrative Reduction.
To enable an analysis of Montague Reduction in the Bayesian framework,
we hereafter focus on propositions in G and S. The ostensible exclusion of
expression- and entity classes (cf. the two leftmost triples of nodes in Fig. 1) from
our probabilistic considerations does not hamper the success of our proposed
model of reduction. This is due to the strong correspondence between basic-
type objects and their corresponding (syntactic or semantic) rules (cf. Sect. 2.1).
The reductive relation between Categorial Grammar and Model-Theoretic
Semantics can be represented via the Bayesian network in Figure 5:
Gn
Sn
Gv
Sv
Gs
Ss
En Ev Es
Figure 5. Post-reductive relations between pairs of propositions ￿Sk, Gk￿.
For simplicity, we assume that every rule in G is supported by exactly one (rele-
vant set of) piece(s) of evidence. As specified in Section 2.3, we take evidence for
a given syntactic rule to be an intuitively well-formed expression whose struc-
ture reflects the rule’s assumed formation process. The replacement of dotted or
dashed arrows (cf. Fig. 1 resp. 2) by ‘continuous’ arrows ↓ (cf. Fig. 4) is motivated
by their denotation of probabilistic dependence relations between propositional
variables (rather than of the map h or h−1), and the attendant dependence of
the probability of the truth of syntactic rules on the probability of the truth of
semantic rules. Moreover, the conditional dependency of syntactic on semantic
12 REDUCTION, CONFIRMATION, AND THE SYNTAX-SEMANTICS RELATION
rules enables us to obtain an aligned chain of arrows, and, thus, to represent a
flow of evidence from the syntactic to the semantic theory.
The independence of proposition pairs ￿Sk, Gk￿ (cf. the lack of horizontal
arrows between nodes) in Figure 5 justifies our preliminary restriction to the
single-proposition case. Correspondingly, we abbreviate Ss as S, Gs as G, and Es
as E. Figures 6 and 7 display the graphs associated with the dependence rela-
tions between S,G and E before and after the establishment of the relation of
Montague Reduction:
S G E
Figure 6. Pre-reductive dependence relations between S, G, and E.
S G E
Figure 7. Post-reductive dependence relations between S, G, and E.
We determine the confirmation of S and G via their relevant probabilities, be-
ginning with the pre-reductive situation (cf. Fig. 6). Its comparison with the
post-reductive situation (Sect. 4.2, 4.3, cf. Fig. 7) will show that a Montague Re-
duction of syntax to semantics effects a boost of the joint (prior and posterior)
probabilities of and a flow of confirmation between the two theories.
4.1. Pre-Reductive Confirmation. Let P1(S) and P1(G) be the marginal
probabilities of the root nodes S,G of the Bayesian network in Figure 6, with P1
the corresponding probability measure. Let P1(E|G) and P1(E|¬G) be the con-
ditional probabilities of the child node E. For convenience, we use the following
abbreviation scheme:11
P1(S) = σ , P1(G) = γ , (2)
P1(E|G) = π , P1(E|¬G) = ρ .
We assume a positive confirmatory relation between E and G, such that π > ρ.
From the network structure in Figure 6, we can read off the conditional and
unconditional independences E ⊥S|G resp. S ⊥G such that P1(S|E) = P1(S).
Evidence E does not confirm (or disconfirm) S. Hence, there is no flow of con-
firmation from the syntactic to the semantic theory. In the absence of the
map h : G → S (or related bridge laws), the variables G and S are proba-
bilistically independent before the reduction:
P1(S,G) = P1(S)P1(G) = γ σ . (3)
By equation (3), the prior probability of the conjunction of S and G equals the
product of the marginal probabilities of the positive instantiations of their root
11To prevent the equivocation of probabilistic and (subsequently introduced) type variables,
we denote numerical values by lowercase Greek letters.
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nodes. Using the methodology of (Bovens and Hartmann, 2003), we obtain their
posterior probability as follows:
P∗1 :=
P1(S,G,E)
P1(E)
=
P1(S,G,E)￿
S,G(S,G,E)
(4)
=
γ π σ
γ π + γ¯ ρ
,
where the denominator of the fraction in the final line is a convex combination
of π and ρ weighed by γ, and where γ¯ := 1− γ.12
We close the present subsection by assessing the degree of confirmation of
the conjunction of S and G. To this aim, we use the difference measure d, cf.
(Carnap, 1950), defined for our case as follows:13
d1 := P1(S,G|E)−P1(S,G) . (5)
Thus, E confirms G if its consideration raises the probability of the conjunction
of S and G. By calculating d1, we show that the latter is indeed the case:
d1 =
γ γ¯ σ (π − ρ)
γ π + γ¯ ρ
. (6)
Assuming that γ,π, ρ, and σ lie in the open interval (0, 1) with π > ρ, the
above fraction is always strictly positive. We summarize our observation in the
following theorem:
Theorem 1. E confirms S and G iff E confirms G.
We next investigate the joint probabilities of S,G in the post-reductive situation.
4.2. Post-Reductive Confirmation. The consideration of Montague’s inter-
theory mapping (cf. the arrow from S to G in Fig. 5, 7) requires a restatement
of the above probabilities. Since G is no longer a root node in Figure 7 (and
is, thus, not assigned a prior probability), we replace the second equation in (2)
by (7), below, where P2 is the new probability measure:
P2(G|S) = 1 , P2(G|¬S) = 0 . (7)
Equation (7) is warranted by Montague’s homomorphism h. All other assign-
ments are as for P1. Our introduction of the new measure P2 is motivated by
the move to a different probabilistic situation, and attendant need to assign the
received Montagovian propositions possibly distinct probabilistic values. Equal-
ity statements of the form P2(S) = P1(S) ensure the possibility of comparing
the respective propositions’ confirmation in different situations.
As encoded by the arrow from S to G, Montague’s mapping effects a flow of
evidence from syntax to semantics. The confirmation of the relevant semantic
rule is defined simply as follows:
Theorem 2. E confirms S iff π > ρ.
12We will hereafter always abbreviate 1− x as x¯.
13As discussed in (Fitelson, 1999; Eells and Fitelson, 2000), results may depend on our
choice of confirmation measure. Whether (and to what extent) they do, will be a question for
future research.
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According to the above theorem, our piece of evidence confirms the semantic
proposition if, as assumed in Section 4.1, E supports G. Equations (7) ensure a
positive flow of confirmation from G to S.
The prior and posterior probabilities of the conjunction of S and G are as
follows (all calculations are in the Appendix):
P2(S,G) = σ , (8)
P∗2 := P2(S,G|E) =
π σ
π σ + ρ σ¯
. (9)
The degree of confirmation of the conjunction of S and G under P2 is recorded
below:
d2 := P2(S,G|E)−P2(S,G) = σ σ¯ (π − ρ)
π σ + ρ σ¯
. (10)
To show the epistemic value of Montagovian reduction, we next compare the
conjunction’s probabilities and degree of confirmation in the two scenarios. We
accept a reduction if it raises the conjunction’s probabilities or evidential sup-
port, and reject (or ignore) it otherwise.
4.3. Comparing Situations. We begin by comparing the conjunction’s prior
probabilities, P1(S,G) and P2(S,G). While the propositional variables S,G
are independent before the reduction, they have become dependent after the
reduction. This is due to the fact that G is no longer a root node in Figure 7.
In order to compare the joint probabilities of S and G, we assume the identity
of P2(G) and P1(G), and P2(E|G) and P1(E|G), respectively. By the first
equality in (7), we further assume the equality in (11)
P2(G) = P2(G|S)P2(S) = σ , (11)
such that γ = σ.
Using the above, we calculate the difference, ∆0, between the conjunction’s
pre- and post-reductive prior probabilities and obtain
∆0 := P2(S,G)−P1(S,G) = σ σ¯ . (12)
Intuitively, the Montague Reduction of Categorial Grammar to Model-Theoretic
Semantics is epistemically valuable if the conjunction’s prior probability is higher
post- than pre-reduction, i.e. if ∆0 > 0. Since we assume all non-h-based prob-
abilities to be non-extreme, we know that the latter is indeed the case.
The difference between the conjunction’s posterior probabilities is also
strictly positive:
∆1 := P2(S,G|E)−P1(S,G|E) = π σ σ¯
π σ + ρ σ¯
. (13)
We show this via the above assumptions, together with the fact that π > ρ.
Our propositions’ confirmation witnesses a similar increase. To establish this,
we calculate the difference between their conjunction’s pre- and post-reductive
degree of confirmation under the difference measure and obtain
∆2 := d2 − d1 = σ σ¯
2 (π − ρ)
π σ + ρ σ¯
. (14)
As can be read off from the expression in (14), the positivity of ∆2 – and the
attendant positive confirmatory impact of Montague Reduction – is conditional
on the requirement that σ ∈ (0, 1) and that π > ρ.
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We have seen that Montague Reduction increases the joint probabilities and
evidential support of the relevant conjunction. Given the similarity between the
models of Montague Reduction and of Nagel Reduction (cf. Sect. 2.2), however,
the probabilies and degree of confirmation of the truth of syntactic and semantic
propositions are not higher after the Montague Reduction than they are after
the Nagel Reduction of syntax to semantics.14 Admittedly, our model of Mon-
tague Reduction captures the syntax-semantics relation more accurately than
the Nagelian model. This does not change the fact, however, that the epistemic
rationales for their adoption are equally strong.
But the similarities between Nagel Reduction and Montague Reduction give
rise to another, more serious, problem: The latter lies in the fact that both
types of intertheoretic relations are established pairwise (such that G is reduced
to S by reducing Gs to Gs, Gn to Gn, etc.). While Montague’s syntax-semantics
relation thus renders the evidence variable E probabilistically relevant for S,
the stipulation of independent morphisms between all pairs ￿Sk, Gk￿ does not
assign the reduction an optimal epistemic value. This is due to the fact that the
probability of syntax reduced to semantics will correspond to the product of the
probabilities of all proposition pairs:15
P2(
￿
k
￿Sk,Gk￿) = P2(Sn,Gn)P2(Sv,Gv)P2(Ss,Gs) (15)
= P2(Sn)P2(Sv)P2(Ss), (by (7))
respectively
P2(
￿
k
￿Sk,Gk|Ek￿) = P2(Sn,Gn|En)P2(Sv,Gv|Ev)P2(Ss,Gs|Es)
= P2(Sn|En)P2(Sv|Ev)P2(Ss|Es) , (16)
such that the probability of the conjunction decreases in inverse proportion to
the number of its conjuncts. Contrary to what is claimed for Nagel Reduction, cf.
(Dijzadji-Bahmani et al., 2010b), the optimal generalization of Bayesian network
representations of Montague Reduction to theories with multiple propositional
elements may not be conceptually straightforward, but requires insight into the
mutual dependencies between same-theory propositions or proposition-reducing
principles.
5. Reduction and Confirmation II: Integrative Reduction
Integrative Reduction (abbreviated IR) accounts for such intratheoretical con-
nections. Its model (presented in Sect. 5.2) is developed in abstraction from a so-
phisticated version of Montague’s ‘two theories’ theory (cf. Sect. 2.1). To increase
the perspicuity of the rule-connecting mechanism, Montague (1973) stipulates
a third level of types, i.e., logico-semantic roˆles which mediate between syntac-
tic categories and their referential domains, cf. (Russell, 1908; Church, 1940).
Every syntactic category k is thus correlated with a semantic type α, whose
associated domain, Dα, constitutes the familiar denotation set of all expressions
in Eα. Figure 8 schematizes the use of types on the level of objects:
14For a Bayesian analysis of (Schaffner’s revised version of) Nagel Reduction, the reader is
referred to (Dijzadji-Bahmani et al., 2010b).
15To simplify notation, we write P2(
￿
k ￿Sk,Gk￿) for P2(Sn, Sv, Ss,Gn,Gv,Gs), etc.
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En Ev Es
Dn Dv DsSemantic Domains
Basic Types
Syntactic Categories
Figure 8. The type basis of syntactic and semantic categories.
To demonstrate the requirements on the use of an intermediate type-level, we
present three different cases, stipulating the existence of multiple, two, or a single
basic type for the reduction of syntactic to semantic propositions. We begin with
a discussion of the multi-type case.
5.1. Case 1: Separate Types. Notably, the assumption of a separate type
for each category pair does not improve upon the above-observed independence
(cf. Sect. 4.3). Let the types e, p, and t be associated with individual objects
(‘entities’), properties, and truth-values, respectively. Assume that the type
correspondent, Ts, of the semantic rule Ss is defined as follows:
Ts. If R ∈ Xv and j ∈ Xn, then R ∗ j ∈ Xs,
where X is neutral between the notation for expression sets E and referential
domains D, and where ∗ is neutral between the concatenation/agreement oper-
ator and the designation of functional application. For reasons of simplicity, we
restrict ourselves to the presentation of the type-correspondent of the semantic
rule S￿s. On the assumption of further types (e.g. the types q and r, associated
with the categories of generalized quantifiers and properties of generalized quan-
tifiers, respectively), the correspondent of the rule S￿￿s is analogously defined.
Note that we will hereafter use the name ‘Ts’ as a hyperonym for the rule T￿s,
such that the type-correspondent of the rule Ss will be ambiguous.
Following the notational convention from the end of Section 3, we denote the
values of variables Ts, Tn, and Tv by Ts,¬Ts,Tn,¬Tn, and Tv,¬Tv, respectively.
The graph in Figure 9 encodes the dependencies of propositional variables after
the reduction via the newly introduced type level:
As in the untyped case (cf. Sect. 4.3), the independence of triples ￿Sk, Tk, Gk￿
warrants the derivation of their joint probabilities via the product of their indi-
vidual probabilities. For this reason, we initially restrict ourselves to the prior
and posterior probabilities of the conjunction of Ts, Ss, and Gs. To empha-
size our model’s connection with the network from Figure 7, we use a similar
abbreviation scheme, with P3 the new probability measure:
P3(Ts) = τ ,
P3(Ss|Ts) = 1 , P3(Ss|¬Ts) = 0 , (17)
P3(Gs|Ts) = 1 , P3(Gs|¬Ts) = 0 ,
P3(Es|Gs) = π , P3(Es|¬Gs) = ρ .
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Gn
Tn
Sn
Gv
Tv
Sv
Gs
Ts
Ss
En Ev Es
Figure 9. Case 1: Separate types.
The equations in the last line are as for Figures 6, 7, above. The identities in
lines two and three are necessitated by the replacement of Ss and Gs by Ts as
root nodes. Since, thus,
P3(Ss) = P3(Ts) = P3(Gs) , (18)
Theorem 2 also holds in the new model. This is due to the strong dependence
of syntactic and semantic on type rules, and the assumption of a positive con-
firmatory relation between E and G.
Admittedly, the attribution of probabilities to our type rules seems less in-
tuitive than the assignment of probabilities to their syntactic or semantic coun-
terparts. This is amended by the equalities in the second and third line of (17).
Thus, the probabilities of Ts, Tn, and Tv can be obtained via the probabilities
of their semantic (or syntactic) correlates Ss, Sn, and Sv (resp. Gs, Gn, and Gv).
The close association of semantic and type rules prompts a general remark:
Our introduction to this paper (cf. Sect. 1) has announced the development of a
new type of intertheoretic relation on the model of Montague’s characterization
of the syntax-semantics relation. As we will show at the end of Section 5.2.2,
the introduction of a separate level of types only serves to elucidate the rela-
tion between same-theory objects and propositions. Given the establishment of
their constructive relations, and attendant identification of propositional inter-
dependencies, the set of types (and associated type-propositions) is dispensable.
Let us proceed to the confirmation of the conjunction of the positive instan-
tiations of the variables Ts, Ss, and Gs. The conjunction’s prior and posterior
probability are as follows:
P3(Ts, Ss,Gs) = τ (19)
P∗3 := P3(Ts, Ss,Gs|Es) =
π τ
π τ + ρ τ¯
. (20)
The probabilistic equivalence of the separately typed and the untyped model
is obvious: Given the equalities P3(Ss) = P2(S), P3(Gs) = P2(G), and
P3(Es|Gs) = P2(E|G) such that τ = σ, it is easy to see the identity between
the prior and posterior probabilities of the conjunction of Ts, Ss, and Gs, respec-
tively of S and G. Like the joint probability of the latter, the joint probability
of former form converges to 0 as their number increases.
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The difference, ∆3, of their associated degrees of confirmation witnesses con-
firmation stasis. Consequently, the conjunction of Ss and Gs is not better con-
firmed than its untyped competitor in the post-reductive situation. We sum-
marize our findings in the following theorem, where |CAT| and |TY| denote the
number of basic (syntactic or semantic) categories and types, respectively:
Theorem 3. If |TY| = |CAT|, then ￿k￿Tk, Sk,Gk￿ has the same prior and
posterior probability and is confirmed to the same degree as
￿
k ￿Sk,Gk￿ under
the difference measure.
5.2. Case 2: Two Types. The desired increase in confirmation requires the
identification of connections between same-theory propositions. Montague’s
framework provides this link: Rather than taking different semantic or syn-
tactic categories and rules to be structurally independent, Montague observes a
strong connection in their constructive properties. Thus, he distinguishes two
different classes of types, i.e. simple (or basic) types and complex (or derived)
types. The types for entities e and truth-values t are identified as simple types;
the type for properties p is identified as a complex type. The simple/complex
distinction is preserved at the level of syntactic categories and semantic domains:
As the category of type-e expressions, the category N (of nouns) is characterized
as a basic category; the category V (of verbs) of type-p expressions as a derived
category. Similarly, the domain of type-e expressions Dn is described as a basic
(or primitive) domain; the domain of type-p expressions Dv is described as a
complex (constructed, or functional) domain.
A formal account of the construction of complex-type domains is easily pro-
vided: According to Montague’s type logic IL and its predecessor, Church’s
Simple Theory of Types (Church, 1940), a domain is constructed iff it is the
function space over primitive (or less complex) domains. Arguably, such func-
tion spaces (e.g. the space Dn → Ds) provide a suitable representation of
other domains (here, the property domain Dp). This is due to the fact that
characteristic functions Dn → {T,F} represent the set of entities of which a
given property is true (false). In a world w, that is inhabited by John, Mary,
and Fido, the property ￿is a dog￿ is, thus, identified with the set {x ∈ Dn |￿is a dog￿(x) = T} = ¶￿Fido￿©. In line with the above, we call members of
the former (i.e. entities) primitive objects; members of the latter (i.e. proper-
ties) are called constructed objects (or functions). We denote types for function
spaces Dα → Dβ (with α,β types in IL) by α→ β.
Let us return to our discussion of the two-typed syntax-semantics reduction.
While the basic types e and t (or their associated rules) are directly involved in
the reduction of the rules Ss, Sn and Gs, Gn, they only serve as ‘building blocks’
in the formulation of the rules Sv,Gv. The above-described mechanism leaves
open two possibilities for the construction of derived-type rules: While rules
for the behavior of complex expressions or objects can be directly formulated in
terms of derived types (such that Dv and V (or their associated rules) are defined
in terms of the derived type e → t (or its rule), cf. the graph in Fig. 10), their
statement can, alternatively, involve rules for the obtaining of basic expressions
and objects (such that Dv and V (or their rules) are only defined in terms of the
domains Ds,Dn resp. the categories S, N (or their rules), cf. the graph in Fig. 11).
As we will see in due course, both formulations yield the same probabilities.
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Figure 10. Case 2.i: Two types direct.
5.2.1. Case 2.i: Two Types Direct. We begin by determining the joint proba-
bilities and confirmation of the conjunction of directly typed propositions (cf.
Fig. 10).
Let P4(Ts) = τ , P4(Tn) = τ ￿, and P4(Tv) = τ ￿￿ be the marginal probabilities
of Ts,Tn, and Tv, respectively. We specify conditional probabilities via the
following scheme:
P4(Tv|Tn,Ts) = 1 , P4(Tv|¬Tn,Ts) = 0 ,
P4(Tv|Tn,¬Ts) = 0 , P4(Tv|¬Tn,¬Ts) = 0 ,
P4(Sv|Tv) = 1 , P4(Sv|¬Tv) = 0 , (21)
P4(Gv|Tv) = 1 , P4(Gv|¬Tv) = 0 ,
P4(Ev|Gv) = π￿￿ , P4(Ev|¬Gv) = ρ￿￿ .
The probabilities of Ts, Ss,Gs,Es resp. Tn, Sn,Gn,En are as in (17). The equa-
tions in lines 1, 2, 4 and 1, 2, 3 ensure a positive flow of confirmation from Gv
to Tv and from Tv to Sv, respectively.
Note that, by the equations in the first two lines, the positive instantiation of
the propositional variable Tv is not only conditionally dependent on the obtaining
of the evidence Ev (given the truth ofGv and Sv), but also on the obtaining of the
evidence En and Es (given the truth of Gn, Gs and Sn, Ss). It is this conditional
dependence, and the attendant flow of confirmation not only from Gv and Sv,
but also from Gn,Gs and Sn, Ss via Tn and Ts to Tv that effects the higher
posterior probabilities and the (possibly) higher degree of confirmation of the
conjunction of the positive instantiation of the above variables.
The prior and posterior probabilities of the conjunction of the variables’
positive instantiations are as follows:
P4(Ts,Tn,Tv, Ss, Sn, Sv,Gs,Gn,Gv) = τ τ
￿ , (22)
P∗4 := P4(Ts,Tn,Tv, Ss, Sn, Sv,Gs,Gn,Gv|Es,En,Ev) . (23)
To show the epistemic value of the two- over the three-typed case (cf. Sect. 5.1),
we must first specify the probabilities of the (initially neglected) rules for entity-
and property-types: The values of P3(Sn),P3(Gn), P3(En) are as for P4. The
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conditional probabilities of Sv,Gv and Ev are analogous to their probabilities
from (21), lines 3–5.
By the above-observed independence (Sect. 5.1, cf. Sect. 4.3), the prior and
posterior probability of the conjunction (Ts,Tn,Tv, Ss, Sn, Sv,Gs,Gn,Gv), cf.
(24) and (25), below, amount to the product of their respective probabilities.
P3(Ts,Tn,Tv, Ss, Sn, Sv,Gs,Gn,Gv) = τ τ
￿ τ ￿￿ , (24)
(P∗3)
￿ := P3(Ts,Tn,Tv, Ss, Sn, Sv,Gs,Gn,Gv|Es,En,Ev) (25)
=
Å
π τ
π τ + ρ τ¯
ãÇ
π￿ τ ￿
π￿ τ ￿ + ρ￿ τ¯ ￿
åÇ
π￿￿ τ ￿￿
π￿￿ τ ￿￿ + ρ￿￿ τ¯ ￿￿
å
.
For comparability, we assume equalities between P4(Sk|Tk) and P3(Sk|Tk),
P4(Gk| Tk) and P3(Gk|Tk), and P4(Ek|Gk) and P3(Ek|Gk) (with (e → t) ≡
p ∈ TY). We begin by comparing the conjunction’s prior probabilities, reflected
in the difference ∆4:
∆4 := P4(Ts,Tn, Ss, Sn, Sv,Gs,Gn,Gv)−P3
Ä￿
k
¨
Tk, Sk,Gk
∂ä
= τ τ ￿ τ¯ ￿￿ (26)
As is clear from the relevant term in (26), the conjunction’s prior probability
is higher after the performance of a two-typed Montague Reduction than it
is after a separately typed Montague Reduction. In particular, the positivity
of ∆4 depends on the non-certainty of Tv such that τ ￿￿ ￿= 1. Under the usual
assumptions (in particular, the assumption that π￿￿ > ρ￿￿), the difference of the
conjunction’s posterior probabilities is also positive.
The conditions for a higher degree of confirmation are motivated by our
previous observations: Given the difference ∆6 := d4 − d5 (with d4 and d5 the
degree of confirmation of the conjunction of the positively instantiated variables
from Figures 10 resp. 9), the replacement of three- by two-typed propositions
of the syntactic and the semantic theory will increase the flow of confirmation
between the two theories only if ∆6 > 0. Simple manipulations show that the
latter is the case if and only if ∆5 > τ τ ￿ τ¯ ￿￿
As can be seen from the above, it is hence ‘easier’ to raise the posterior
probability of Montague’s theories by establishing a relation between different
syntactic and semantic objects than it is to increase their degree of confirmation.
Especially if (P∗3)￿ is (comparatively) high, the confirmation may not be greater
after the reduction.
Our findings are captured in the following theorem, where TY2 and TYn
are the basic-type sets associated with theories of two- and n-typed syntax/
semantics, with TY2 ⊆ TYn.
Theorem 4. If |TY2| < |TYn|, then the conjunction of two-typed propositions
has a higher prior and posterior probability and is better confirmed under the
difference measure than the conjunction of their n-typed correspondents if the
following holds:
i. The marginal probability of the truth of the propositions for members
of TYn is non-extreme.
ii. For every proposition Ti associated with a member, i, of TYn\TY2, the
likelihood of Ti on Gi is higher than the likelihood of ¬Ti on Gi.
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iii. The difference between the posterior probability of the conjunction of two-
and n-typed propositions is greater than the product of the marginal prob-
ability of the truth of the propositions for members of TY2 and the prob-
ability of the falsity of the propositions for members of TYn\TY2.
Since conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied by our standard assumptions (cf.
Sect. 4), we regard Theorem 4 as a rationale for the introduction of a (non-
Nagelian) model of the two-typed version of Montague Reduction (cf. Def. 3,
below).
5.2.2. Case 2.ii: Two Types Indirect. To compare the probabilities of the directly
with those of the indirectly typed propositions, we next consider the probabilities
of the network in Figure 11.
Gn
Tn
Sn
Gv
Sv
Gs
Ts
Ss
En Ev Es
Figure 11. Case 2.ii: Two types indirect.
The mediated formulation of derived-type rules (cf. the chains of arrows from Tn
and Ts via Sn and Ss to Sv) requires the replacement of the first three lines
in (21) by the equalities in (27), below (with P5 the new probability measure):
P5(Sv|Sn, Ss) = 1 , P5(Sv|¬Sn, Ss) = 0 , (27)
P5(Sv|Sn,¬Ss) = 0 , P5(Sv|¬Sn,¬Ss) = 0 .
The conditional probability of Gv is similarly defined: Rather than depending
only on the probability of Tv, the probability of the truth of Sv is now depen-
dent on the probabilities of Sn, Ss. This is not to claim a fundamental difference
between the presently and previously introduced models: Notably, our choice
of different type-rule formulations does not impact the theories’ probabilities
and confirmation. This is due to the probabilistic equivalence of chains of ar-
rows (Ts → Ss) ◦ (Ss → Sv), (Ts, Tn → Tv) ◦ (Tv → Sv), and the corresponding
identities P5(Sv) = P4(Sv), P5(Gv) = P4(Gv). The prior and posterior proba-
bilities and the degree of confirmation of indirectly typed propositions are thus
the same as those of directly typed propositions.
We have motivated our presentation of the model of a refined version of
Montague Reduction by the need to identify dependencies between same-theory
objects and propositions. Our investigation into the probabilistic impact of dif-
ferent rule-formulations yields further insight into the latter requirement: While
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the use of types (as a surrogate for term-connecting bridge laws) increases the
perspicuity of the effected reduction, the improvement of our theories’ probabili-
ties and degree of confirmation is not conditional on the introduction of an inter-
mediate type level. This is warranted by the identity of P5(Ss),P5(Ts),P5(Gs)
and P5(Sn),P5(Tn),P4(Gn), respectively.
16 The only requirement lies in the
establishment of definitional connections between same-theory objects (such
that Dv := (Dn → Ds)).
The latter constitute the core feature of Integrative Reduction. We define
Integrative Reduction as a sophisticated version of Montague Reduction, that
differs from the latter with respect to the establishment of constructive rela-
tions between same-theory objects and propositions. Since the introduction of a
different basic type for every category/domain pair prevents the establishment
of this type of intratheoretic relation, a separately-typed variant of Montague
Reduction (along the lines of Sect. 5.1) does not qualify as a proper case of
Integrative Reduction.17 This is due to the probabilistic equivalence of their as-
sociated propositions, and the attendant collapse of the separately-typed model
of Integrative Reduction into a variant of Montague Reduction.
Our definition of Integrative Reduction runs as follows:
Definition 3 (Integrative Reduction (IR)). A type of directed (or non-
symmetric) dependency relation, implicit in (Montague, 1973), that is defined
by the existence of intertheoretical and intratheoretical connections (i.e. con-
structibility relations) between objects of the two related theories, and by the
derivability of every proposition in the phenomenological theory from a corre-
sponding proposition of the fundamental theory.
Figure 12 (below) captures the commonalities and differences between Nagel
Reduction, Montague Reduction, and Integrative Reduction.
Derivability

®
NR
´
Syntactic intertheoretic connectability (via bridge laws); R

Syn. interth. connect’y,
Undirected dependency
Sem. interth. connect’y,
Directed dependency
MR
IR
´
Intrath. connectability
(constructibility rel’s)
Figure 12. Nagel Reduction vs. Montague Reduction vs. Inte-
grative Reduction.
We conclude the present section with considerations about the optimal number
of basic types (or primitive semantic domains).
5.3. Case 3: One Type. Our previous findings suggest an inverse propor-
tionality between the theories’ probabilities, or degree of confirmation, and the
number of basic types: As the latter decreases, the former rises. To check this
16This constitutes the probabilistic basis for linguists’ choice between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’
interpretations of natural language into set-theoretic models, cf. (Partee, 1997).
17Note, however, the possibility of treating Integrative Reductions of any kind (including
non-proper reductions) as a generalization of Montague Reduction.
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hypothesis, and identify possible constraints, we now turn to the last case. Fig-
ure 13 displays a graph associated with the assumption of a single type, e, for the
formulation of syntactic and semantic rules. By the results from Section 5.2, our
type choice does not influence the confirmation of Montagovian propositions.
Gn
Tn
Sn
Gv
Sv
Gs
Ss
En Ev Es
Figure 13. Case 3: One type.
A glance at the graph in Figure 13 reveals the large number of root nodes and
conditional independencies. This is due to the impossibility of constructing the
remaining types (e.g. p (or e → t) and t) from a single base type (here, e), and
the related need to separately introduce their associated syntactic and semantic
rules.
The abbreviation scheme, below, contains the marginal and conditional prob-
abilities of all nodes in the Bayesian network in Figure 13:
P6(Tn) = τ
￿ , (28)P6(Ss) = σ , P6(Sv) = σ￿￿
P6(Gs) = γ , P6(Gv) = γ￿￿ , P6(Sn|Tn) = 1
P6(Sn|¬Tn) = 0 , P6(Gn|Tn) = 1 , P6(Gn|¬Tn) = 0
P6(En|Gn) = π￿ , P6(En|¬Gn) = ρ￿ , P6(Es|Gs) = π
P6(Es|¬Gs) = ρ , P6(Ev|Gv) = π￿￿ , P6(Ev|¬Gv) = ρ￿￿
The probabilities of Tn, Sn,Gn, and En are as in (17). The other values in the
first, second, ultimate and penultimate lines correspond to those from (2). By
the absence of property- or truth-value types, the positive flow of confirmation
between Gn,Tn, and Sn (cf. ll. 4, 5) is disabled at the verbal and sentential level.
The independence of tuples ￿Tn, Sn, Gn￿, ￿Ss, Gs￿, ￿Sv, Gv￿ facilitates the
comparative assessment of our theories’ probabilities and confirmation. While
the prior and posterior probabilities of the conjunction of Tn, Sn, and En corre-
spond to the probabilities of the separately typed case in Section 5.1 (granted
the usual comparability conditions), the probabilities of (Ss,Gs) and (Sv,Gv) are
parallel to those of the pre-reductive untyped case (cf. Sect. 4.1; Fig. 6). Their
multiplication yields the following prior probability:
P6(Tn, Sn, Ss, Sv,Gn,Gs,Gv) = P6(Tn, Sn,Gn)P6(Ss,Gs)P6(Sv,Gv) (29)
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By the above argument, (29) is greater than the prior probability of the con-
junction of untyped propositions in the pre-reductive Montagovian, but smaller
than the conjunction of separately typed propositions in the post-reductive Mon-
tagovian situation. The same holds, by an argument from P∗2 and (P∗3)￿, of the
conjunction’s posterior probability:
P∗6 := P6(Tn, Sn, Ss, Sv,Gn,Gs,Gv|En,Es,Ev) . (30)
To compare our theories’ degree of confirmation, d6, with the support of the
separately typed model, we calculate ∆7 := d6 − d5. Notably, ∆7 is negative
under the familar conditions (i.e. a positive confirmatory relation between ev-
ery E and G, and non-extreme marginal probabilities of the truth of syntactic,
semantic, or type propositions). Thus, the conjunction of the positive instanti-
ation of single-typed propositional variables is confirmed to a lower degree than
the conjunction of the positive instantiation of separately typed variables.
The concession of a Montagovian map between the elements in ￿Ss, Gs￿
and ￿Sv, Gv￿ (cf. Sect. 4.2) hardly improves this situation: While the homo-
morphism h cancels some of the above-observed independencies – requiring a
restatement of the relevant probabilities in (31) (below) – the theories’ probabil-
ities and degree of confirmation under the difference measure do not exceed that
of the separately typed model. To mark the move to a different probabilistic
situation, we introduce the new probability measure P7. Significantly,
P7(Gs|Ss) = 1 , P7(Gs|¬Ss) = 0 , (31)
P7(Gv|Sv) = 1 , P7(Gv|¬Sv) = 0 ,
(cf. Section 4.2, (7)). All other assignments are as above.
Since tuples
¨
(Tk, ) Sk,Gk
∂
remain independent, we calculate their joint prob-
abilities via the mechanism, above. The prior and posterior probability of the
conjunction are
P7(Tn, Sn, Ss, Sv,Gn,Gs,Gv) = σ σ
￿￿ τ ￿ (32)
P∗7 =
Ç
π σ
π σ + ρ σ¯
åÇ
π￿￿ σ￿￿
π￿￿ σ￿￿ + ρ￿￿ σ¯￿￿
åÇ
π￿ τ ￿
π￿ τ ￿ + ρ￿ τ¯ ￿
å
. (33)
It is easy to see that, granted the above requirements, the conjunction’s prior and
posterior probabilities under P7 are exactly the probabilities of (24) and (25).
We summarize the results of our investigation of the separate-, the two-, and
the single-type case in the following theorem, where TYm and TYn are different
basic-type sets such that TYm ⊆ TYn:
Theorem 5 (Fewness). If TYm enables the construction of all linguistically
relevant types, then, granted the conditions from Theorem 4,
￿
m ￿Sm,Gm￿ has a
higher prior and posterior probability and is better confirmed under the difference
measure than
￿
n￿Sn,Gn￿.
Given the derivability of all syntactic or semantic propositions, the minimal
number of basic types yields the highest probabilities and (given certain con-
ditions) effects a maximal flow of confirmation between the two theories that
are related by an Integrative Reduction. As a result, the adoption of our model
of Integrative Reduction (in addition to the Nagelian Model) is epistemically
warranted.
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6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have identified two new types of intertheoretic relations, Mon-
tague Reduction and Integrative Reduction, that are inspired by Montague’s
(1973) presentation of the relation between Categorial Grammar and Model-
Theoretic Semantics. We have shown their commonalities with Nagel Reduction
and established their salient differences. To provide an epistemic rationale for
the introduction of our model of Integrative Reduction, we have given its anal-
ysis in the framework of Bayesian confirmation theory. We have shown that the
Integrative Reduction of syntax to semantics yields higher prior and posterior
probabilities and (given certain conditions) a higher degree of confirmation than
their Montague Reduction or Nagel Reduction.
We close our paper by indicating how our model of Integrative Reduction can
be incorporated into a variant of Schaffner’s revised model of Nagel Reduction.
As is well known, Schaffner’s variant of Nagel Reduction accommodates the di-
rected dependency of intertheoretic reduction relations through the introduction
of a dedicated level of ‘corrected’ propositions, cf. (Schaffner, 1967; 1974). Thus,
every proposition T1 resp. T2 of the fundamental or phenomenological theory has
a corrected variant T ∗1 , resp. T ∗2 , such that the deduction of T2 from T1 proceeds
via T ∗1 and T ∗2 . To transform our model of Integrative Reduction into a variant of
Schaffner’s revised model, we thus only need to introduce a corrected version, S∗k
resp. G∗k, of every proposition, Sk resp. Gk, in S or G. We leave the elaboration
of this ‘Schaffner-style’ variant of our model of Integrative Reduction for another
occasion.
Appendix A: Proofs and Calculations for Section 4
We have calculated the pre-reductive probabilities of the conjunction of the posi-
tive instantiations of S and G in Section 4.1. The joint distribution, P2(S,G,E),
of the (post-reductive) graph in Figure 7 is given by the expression
P2(S)P2(G)P2(E|G).
Using the methodology employed in (Bovens and Hartmann, 2003), the prior
probability of the conjunction of S and G is obtained as follows:
P2(S,G) =
￿
E
P2(S,G, E) = π σ + π¯ σ = σ . (34)
We yield the posterior probability, P∗2 := P2(S,G|E), thus:
P∗2 =
P2(S,G,E)
P2(E)
=
π σ
π σ + ρ σ¯
. (35)
To obtain the difference ∆0, we calculate
P2(S,G)−P1(S,G) = σ − σ2 = σ σ¯ .
This proves the following proposition:
Proposition 1. ∆0 = 0 iff σ = 0 or 1; ∆0 > 0 iff σ ∈ (0, 1).
The difference ∆1 between the conjunction’s pre- and post-reductive poste-
rior probabilities is obtained as follows:
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∆1 := P
∗
2 −P∗1 =
π σ − π σ2
π σ + ρ σ¯
=
π σ σ¯
π σ + ρ σ¯
. (36)
From the difference measure
d2 := P2(S,G|E)−P2(S,G) = σ σ¯ (π − ρ)
π σ + ρ σ¯
, (37)
we calculate the difference ∆2 between the conjunction’s degree of confirmation
before and after the Montague Reduction as follows:
∆2 := d2 − d1 = σ σ¯ (π − ρ)− σ
2 σ¯ (π − ρ)
π σ + ρ σ¯
=
σ σ¯2 (π − ρ)
π σ + ρ σ¯
. (38)
This completes our proofs and calculations for Section 4.
Appendix B: Proofs and Calculations for Section 5
Let us consider the confirmation of the conjunction of the positive instantia-
tions of propositional variables for the separate-type case (case 1). The joint
distribution P3(Ts, Ss, Gs, Es) is given by the expression
P3(Ts)P3(Ss|Ts)P3(Gs|Ts)P3(Es|Gs).
To obtain the prior probability of the conjunction of Ts, Ss, and Gs, we calculate
P3(Ts, Ss,Gs) =
￿
E
P3(Ts, Ss,Gs, Es) = τ . (39)
The posterior probability, P∗3 := P3(Ts, Ss,Gs|Es), is obtained as follows:
P∗3 =
P3(Ts, Ss,Gs,Es)
P3(Es)
=
π τ
π τ + ρ τ¯
. (40)
The difference, ∆3, between the degree of confirmation of separately typed and
untyped propositions witnesses confirmation stasis:
∆3 := d3 − d2 = 0 , (41)
where d2 is as above, and d3 = d2.
We next discuss the probabilities and degree of confirmation of the two-
type case (case 2). The joint distribution P4(Ts, Tn, Tv, Ss, Sn, Sv, Gs, Gn, Gv,
Es, En, Ev) is given by the expression
P4(Ts)P4(Tn)P4(Tv|Ts, Tn)P4(Ss|Ts)P4(Sn|Tn)P4(Sv|Tn, Ts)P4(Gs|Ts) (42)
P4(Gn|Tn)P4(Gv|Tn, Ts)P4(Es|Gs)P4(En|Gn)P4(Ev|Gv) .
The prior probability of the conjunction of positive instantiations of the above
variables is as follows:
P4(Ts,Tn,Tv, Ss, Sn, Sv,Gs,Gn,Gv) = τ τ
￿ . (43)
Their posterior probability, P∗4 := P4(Ts,Tn,Tv, Ss, Sn, Sv,Gs,Gn,Gv|Es,En,
Ev), is obtained thus:
P∗4 =
P4(Ts,Tn,Tv, Ss, Sn, Sv,Gs,Gn,Gv,Es,En,Ev)
P4(Es,En,Ev)
(44)
=
π π￿ π￿￿ τ τ ￿
π π￿ π￿￿ τ τ ￿ + ρ ρ￿ ρ￿￿ τ¯ τ¯ ￿
.
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Rather than calculating all 28 possibilities, we use the equalities in (17)–(18)
and (22) to isolate the significant, i.e. non-zero, cases. Since the non-uniform
(i.e. positive or negative) instantiation of Tk, Sk, and Gk renders the product
in (42) zero, we restrict our attention to the following two cases:
i. Ts,Tn,Tv, Ss, Sn, Sv,Gs,Gn,Gv;
ii. ¬Ts,¬Tn,¬Tv,¬Ss,¬Sn,¬Sv,¬Gs,¬Gn,¬Gv.
The degree of confirmation of the conjunction of the truth of the propositions
under the difference measure is as follows:
d4 := P
∗
4 −P4(Ts,Tn, Ss, Sn, Sv,Gs,Gn,Gv) (45)
=
τ τ ￿ τ¯ τ¯ ￿ (π π￿ π￿￿ − ρ ρ￿ ρ￿￿)
π π￿ π￿￿ τ τ ￿ + ρ ρ￿ ρ￿￿ τ¯ τ¯ ￿
.
To obtain the difference ∆4 between the prior probabilities of the conjunction of
three- and two-typed propositions, we calculate
∆4 := P4(Ts,Tn,Tv, Ss, Sn, Sv,Gs,Gn,Gv)−P3(Ts,Tn,Tv, Ss, Sn, Sv,Gs,Gn,Gv)
= τ τ ￿ − τ τ ￿ τ ￿￿ = τ τ ￿ τ¯ ￿￿ . (46)
Proposition 2, below, summarizes the positivity conditions for ∆4:
Proposition 2. ∆4 = 0 iff either (i) τ = 0, (ii) τ ￿ = 0, or (iii) τ ￿￿ = 1. ∆4 > 0
iff τ, τ ￿, and τ ￿￿ ∈ (0, 1).
The difference ∆5 between the conjunction’s posterior probabilities is ob-
tained as follows:
∆5 := P
∗
4 − (P∗3)￿, (47)
with P∗4 as above and
(P∗3)
￿ =
Å
π τ
π τ + ρ τ¯
ãÇ
π￿ τ ￿
π￿ τ ￿ + ρ￿ τ¯ ￿
åÇ
π￿￿ τ ￿￿
π￿￿ τ ￿￿ + ρ￿￿ τ¯ ￿￿
å
. (48)
To show that ∆5 > 0, we first observe that the function
f(τ ￿￿) :=
π￿￿ τ ￿￿
π￿￿ τ ￿￿ + ρ￿￿ τ¯ ￿￿
(49)
is strictly monotonically increasing in τ ￿￿. Consequently,
f(τ ￿￿) ≤ f(1) = 1 . (50)
By the assumption that π,π￿, ρ, ρ￿, τ, τ ￿ ∈ (0, 1), it thus holds that
(P∗3)
￿ ≤
Å
π τ
π τ + ρ τ¯
ãÇ
π￿ τ ￿
π￿ τ ￿ + ρ￿ τ¯ ￿
å
.
Then,
∆5 ≥ X ·
Ç
1
π π￿ π￿￿ τ τ ￿ + ρ ρ￿ ρ￿￿ τ¯ τ¯ ￿
− 1
(π τ + ρ τ¯)(π￿ τ ￿ + ρ￿ τ¯ ￿)π￿￿
å
(51)
= X ￿ · ￿(π τ + ρ τ¯)(π￿ τ ￿ + ρ￿ τ¯ ￿)π￿￿ − ￿π π￿ π￿￿ τ τ ￿ + ρ ρ￿ ρ￿￿ τ¯ τ¯ ￿￿￿
= X ￿ · ￿π π￿￿ ρ￿ τ τ¯ ￿ + π￿ π￿￿ ρ τ¯ τ ￿ + ρ ρ￿ τ¯ τ¯ ￿ · ￿π￿￿ − ρ￿￿￿￿ .
with
X := π π￿ π￿￿ τ τ ￿
X ￿ :=
π π￿ π￿￿ τ τ ￿
(π τ + ρ τ¯)(π￿ τ ￿ + ρ￿ τ¯ ￿)π￿￿ · (π π￿ π￿￿ τ τ ￿ + ρ ρ￿ ρ￿￿ τ¯ τ¯ ￿) .
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The expression in the final line of (51) is greater than 0 if π￿￿ > ρ￿￿. Note that this
is a sufficient, not a necessary condition. However, since our rules’ confirmation
by the relevant piece(s) of evidence constitutes one of our permanent assumptions
(cf. Sect. 4.1), we content ourselves with this criterion.
To assess the confirmatory status of the direct two-typed case, we first iden-
tify the measures d4, d5, with
d4 := P
∗
4 −P4(Ts,Tn, Ss, Sn, Sv,Gs,Gn,Gv) (52)
=
τ τ ￿ τ¯ τ¯ ￿ (π π￿ π￿￿ − ρ ρ￿ ρ￿￿)
π π￿ π￿￿ τ τ ￿ + ρ ρ￿ ρ￿￿ τ¯ τ¯ ￿
and
d5 := (P
∗
3)
￿ −P3(Tn,Ts,Tv, Sn, Ss, Sv,Gn,Gs,Gv) (53)
=
Å
π τ
π τ + ρ τ¯
ãÇ
π￿ τ ￿
π￿ τ ￿ + ρ￿ τ¯ ￿
åÇ
π￿￿ τ ￿￿
π￿￿ τ ￿￿ + ρ￿￿ τ¯ ￿￿
å
− τ τ ￿ τ ￿￿ .
Their difference, ∆6 := d4 − d5, is easily obtained though the use of the fact
that di−dk = (P∗i −Pi(. . . ))−(P∗k−Pk(. . . )) = (P∗i −P∗k)−(Pi(. . . )−Pk(. . . ))
such that
∆6 =
￿
P∗4 −P4
Ä￿
k
¨
Tk, Sk,Gk
∂ä￿
−
￿
(P∗3)
￿ −P3
Ä￿
k
¨
Tk, Sk,Gk
∂ä￿
= ∆5 − τ τ ￿ τ¯ ￿￿. (54)
We close by considering the confirmation of the conjunction in the single-type
case (case 3). The joint distribution P6(Tn, Ss, Sn, Sv, Gs, Gn, Gv, Es, En, Ev) is
given by the expression
P6(Tn)P6(Ss)P6(Sv)P6(Gs)P6(Gv) (55)
P6(Sn|Tn)P6(Gn|Tn)P6(En|Gn)P6(Es|Gs)P6(Ev|Gv) .
Our calculation of the conjunction’s prior and posterior probabilities exploit the
independence of pairs, ￿Sk, Gk￿, together with the results from Sections 4.1, 4.2,
5.1 such that
P6(Tn, Sn, Ss, Sv,Gn,Gs,Gv) = P6(Tn, Sn,Gn)P6(Ss,Gs)P6(Sv,Gv)(56)
= γγ￿￿ σσ￿￿ τ ￿ ,
and
P∗6 := P6(Tn, Sn, Ss, Sv,Gn,Gs,Gv|En,Es,Ev) (57)
=
Ç
π￿ τ ￿
π￿ τ ￿ + ρ￿ τ¯ ￿
åÇ
γ π σ
γ π + γ¯ ρ
åÇ
γ￿￿ π￿￿ σ￿￿
γ￿￿ π￿￿ + γ¯￿￿ ρ￿￿
å
.
We assess the conjunction’s evidential support via the measure d6 and observe
that, under the positivity conditions from d1 and d5, the difference d6 is also
positive:
d6 := P
∗
6 −P6(Tn, Sn, Ss, Sv,Gn,Gs,Gv) (58)
=
Ç
π￿ τ ￿
π￿ τ ￿ + ρ￿ τ¯ ￿
åÇ
γ π σ
γ π + γ¯ ρ
åÇ
γ￿￿ π￿￿ σ￿￿
γ￿￿ π￿￿ + γ¯￿￿ ρ￿￿
å
− γ γ￿￿ σ σ￿￿ τ ￿ .
From the measures d5 and d6, above, we obtain ∆7 as follows:
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∆7 =
Ç
π￿ τ ￿
π￿ τ ￿ + ρ￿ τ¯ ￿
åÇ
γ π σ
γ π + γ¯ ρ
åÇ
γ￿￿ π￿￿ σ￿￿
γ￿￿ π￿￿ + γ¯￿￿ ρ￿￿
å
− γ γ￿￿ σ σ￿￿ τ ￿ (59)
−
ÇÇ
π τ
π τ + ρ τ¯
åÇ
π￿ τ ￿
π￿ τ ￿ + ρ￿ τ¯ ￿
åÇ
π￿￿ τ ￿￿
π￿￿ τ ￿￿ + ρ￿￿ τ¯ ￿￿
å
− τ τ ￿ τ ￿￿
å
= − σ σ￿￿ τ ￿ (1− γγ￿￿ )
ÇÇ
π
π τ + ρ τ¯
åÇ
π￿
π￿ τ ￿ + ρ￿ τ¯ ￿
åÇ
π￿￿
π￿￿ τ ￿￿ + ρ￿￿ τ¯ ￿￿
å
− 1
å
.
Since expressions of the form π/(π τ + ρ τ¯) are greater than 1 for every π, ρ, τ of
the same type if π > ρ and τ ∈ (0, 1), the difference ∆7 is always negative. This
completes our calculations.
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